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What type of common asylum regime would Europeans support? We con-
ducted a survey asking 18,000 citizens across fifteen European countries about
their preferences regarding different mechanisms for allocating asylum seek-
ers across countries. A large majority supports an allocation that is propor-
tional to each country’s capacity over the status quo policy of allocation based
on the country of first entry. This majority support is weakened but persists
even among a randomly assigned subset of respondents who were made aware
that moving to proportional allocation would increase the number of asylum
seekers allocated to their own country. These results suggest that citizens care
deeply about the fairness of the responsibility-sharing mechanism rather than
only the consequences of the asylum policy. The findings also highlight a po-
tential pathway toward reform of the Common European Asylum System.
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As Europe faces the most severe refugee crisis since World War II, reforming the Common
European Asylum System (CEAS) has emerged as an urgent policy challenge for European
governments. With more than 1.3 million new asylum claims lodged in Europe in 2015 alone
[1], policymakers are struggling to design robust and fair asylum policies that honor interna-
tional commitments and treaties, like the 1951 Refugee Convention, and also inspire domestic
public support. The crisis increasingly threatens the social cohesion of many European coun-
tries and has called into doubt the ability of democratic governments to collaborate in providing
effective humanitarian protection for refugees.
One of the main reasons why the refugee crisis has become so intractable is the lack of a
fair responsibility-sharing mechanism involving all countries that are part of the Dublin Regula-
tion, which determines the allocation of asylum-applications across member states. By “Dublin
countries,” we refer to all European Union member states that currently apply the Dublin Reg-
ulation, as well as Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein, which are part of the Euro-
pean Free Trade Association. Denmark has a separate but similar agreement with the European
Union. Under the current Dublin Regulation, which is a binding law for all member states of
the European Union, the first Dublin country an asylum seeker enters is responsible for regis-
tering the asylum claim. Since its inception, this allocation rule has been criticized for creating
a disproportionate burden for the external border countries of the European Union, where most
asylum seekers first arrive [2, 3, 4]. Within the constraints of the Dublin Regulation, govern-
ments also have other policy tools and opt-out clauses within EU immigration and asylum law
to influence the number of asylum applications they receive, which further compounds the prob-
lem of unequal allocation [5]. In the face of the current crisis, the Dublin system has buckled
under the rapid increase in asylum applications, leading to chaos and trapping refugees in limbo
[6]. The fallout has included considerable costs for the European economies, particularly the
temporary suspensions of the Schengen Agreement and re-installation of border controls by
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some countries.
As a result, there has been intense pressure to reform the CEAS, and some have proposed
moving to a proportional allocation mechanism whereby asylum seekers are allocated based on
each country’s capacity [7, 8]. However, progress on this front has been slow. The allocation of
asylum seekers across Dublin countries presents a classic problem of international commitment
and cooperation [9, 10, 11]. On the one hand, member countries would collectively benefit
from coordinating humanitarian protection for refugees and avoiding the costs that result from
unregulated and often chaotic refugee flows. On the other hand, each country individually has
an incentive to free ride and take in as few asylum seekers as possible, especially given that
policymakers seeking reelection face widespread public backlash against government efforts to
accommodate asylum seekers. Indeed, as Figure 1 shows, across the fifteen European countries
we surveyed, not a single one has a population willing to accept more asylum seekers with open
arms.
Despite the salience of the crisis for the public and the contentious policy debates about how
to reform the CEAS, we know little about the type of common asylum regime that European
voters want. Can the Dublin countries forge a consensus, or do domestic preferences vary so
widely as to rule out any institutional reform that would fairly allocate asylum seekers? While
some scholars have examined public attitudes toward asylum seekers in general [12, 13, 14, 15],
we are not aware of other studies that cross-nationally examine mass attitudes on how to allocate
asylum seekers in the CEAS. Moreover, there is a general lack of evidence regarding domestic
support for the design of international institutions. This is a notable lacuna in the social science
literature given that the successful functioning of international institutions hinges on whether
their design is widely supported by domestic voters and upholds shared norms about equality
and fairness [16].
[Figure 1 about here.]
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Using a large-scale survey involving 18,000 eligible voters from national samples in fifteen
European countries that belong to the CEAS, we provide novel evidence on mass attitudes to-
ward European asylum allocation. The chosen countries represent traditional, major EU powers
as well as new members, border and interior countries, non-EU countries that are part of the
CEAS, and countries with few and many asylum seekers. The Materials and Methods section
and the Supplementary Information include details about the sample, design, and statistical
analysis. We used entropy balancing [17] to re-weight the samples to match the age, education,
and gender distributions of the populations in each country. In the Supplementary Informa-
tion we also report the unweighted results, which are substantively indistinguishable from the
weighted results.
Our survey asked voters to choose between three allocation rules. The first is the Dublin
Regulation status quo, which allocates asylum seekers based on the country of first entry. The
second is a proportional allocation that distributes asylum seekers in proportion to each coun-
try’s capacity (defined by population size, GDP, and other factors). This proportional allocation
scheme has been proposed by the European Commission and, as further explained below, is
rooted in the fairness principle of proportional equality. The third allocation rule is an equal al-
location, in which each country receives an equal number of asylum seekers. While this scheme
has not been formally proposed in the current asylum debate, it appeals to the related fairness
principle of numerical equality. Therefore, including this option allows us to measure the extent
to which respondents distinguish between these two fundamental conceptions of fairness in the
asylum context. See the Supplementary Information for the phrasing used in the questions.
In forming their preferences among the three allocation mechanisms, respondents face a
conflict between consequentialist considerations and norms of distributive justice. Respondents
who care mostly about the consequences of the asylum policy will likely prefer the allocation
rule that brings the fewest asylum seekers to their country. However, respondents might also
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be driven by normative considerations and care about fairness in the design of the asylum allo-
cation mechanism. Both the proportional and equal allocation rules are based on fundamental
principles of distributive justice. In particular, the concept of proportional allocation is grounded
in Aristotle’s celebrated maxim of proportional equality, which stipulates, “Equals should be
treated equally, and unequals, unequally in proportion to relevant similarities and differences”
(Nicomachean Ethics). According to this principle, an allocation of a joint burden between
members of a group is considered just if it distributes the burden in proportion to the members’
relevant capacities. Previous research suggests that the norm of proportional equality is often
deeply ingrained in people’s understanding of fairness in the world [18, 19, 20, 21, 22], and
we therefore expect that respondents might be attracted to the idea that countries with higher
capacities should shoulder a larger responsibility in the asylum context. In contrast, the equal
allocation rule is grounded in the distributive justice principle of numerical equality, which stip-
ulates that an allocation of a joint burden is just if members are treated equally. The numerical
equality principle, a special case of proportional equality, may appeal to respondents because
it is simple, does not depend on a potentially arbitrary assessment of the countries’ capacities,
and is commonly used as a distributive fairness norm in a vast array of policy areas, from voting
rights (“one person, one vote”) to military conscription.
In our study, we expect that respondents’ normative and consequentialist considerations
act as colliding forces, and we designed a set of randomly assigned manipulations (described
below) to determine which force overrides the other when the two are in conflict. The answer
is not only of theoretical interest but also has major implications for the viability of a potential
reform of the Dublin Regulation.
Which asylum allocation mechanism do Europeans prefer? The top left panel in Figure 2
shows the results for the baseline condition, which did not include any additional interventions
but simply asked respondents to indicate their preferences regarding each of the three mech-
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anisms: proportional allocation, equal allocation, or country of first entry. A large majority
of 72% of respondents prefer proportional allocation, and this overwhelming support holds in
every country, ranging between 58% (Germany) and 87% (Greece). This suggests that respon-
dents are strongly attracted to the norm of proportional equality. In stark contrast, only 18%
of voters prefer the country of first entry, even though this has been the status quo since the
inception of the Dublin system in the 1990s. In addition, only 10% of respondents prefer an
equal allocation, suggesting that few voters are attracted to the alternative fairness principle of
numerical equality in this context.
This strong public support for moving toward a system of proportional allocation is sur-
prising given that most countries would receive a higher number of asylum seekers under pro-
portional allocation than under the status quo. In fact, if voters primarily care about the con-
sequences of the policy, we would expect support for proportional allocation to be stronger
in countries that would receive fewer asylum seekers under this allocation rule compared to
country of first entry.
[Figure 2 about here.]
The countries in Figure 2 are ordered such that the country at the bottom would see the
largest increase and the country at the top would see the largest decrease in the number of
asylum seekers when moving from the status quo to proportional allocation, with the dashed
horizontal line separating the countries that would see an increase versus a decrease. In the
baseline condition, we find no systematic relationship between the change in the number of
asylum seekers a country would experience and the support for proportional allocation com-
pared to country of first entry (p-value = 0.25 for Spearman’s ρ).
Given the overwhelming support for proportional allocation across Europe, even in coun-
tries that would have to shoulder a greater responsibility compared to the status quo, one might
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ask whether respondents prefer proportional allocation over the other allocation mechanisms
because they do not fully understand the implications of each option or because they incorrectly
assume that proportional allocation is actually the status quo. To test for this, our survey ran-
domly assigned half of the respondents in each country to receive an additional information
treatment. This informed respondents that allocation based on the country of first entry is the
status quo regulation and also presented arguments typically used in public debate to justify the
various allocations. See the Methods section below for the wordings for all randomized treat-
ments, and see the Supplementary Information for covariate balance checks across the treatment
conditions in each country.
The top right panel in Figure 2 shows that when respondents receive the information treat-
ment, the distribution of support for the three allocation mechanisms is virtually identical to
the distribution in the baseline condition, demonstrating that the additional information does
not systematically alter the respondents’ preferences. (Of the fifteen country-specific χ2 tests
of independence between allocation mechanism preferences and information treatment assign-
ment, only one was statistically significant at level α = 0.05.) In additional analysis shown
in the Supplementary Information, we also find that respondents’ level of knowledge about the
refugee crisis does not systematically moderate the effect of the information treatment. These
findings suggest that respondents widely share the norm of proportional equality, that this prin-
ciple is so entrenched that it is unaffected by status quo bias, and that respondents need not
possess extensive policy knowledge or be presented with arguments in its favor to grasp its
normative appeal.
How deep does this support for proportional allocation run? To examine the strength of the
normative considerations, our survey also cross-randomized a consequences treatment. It ex-
plicitly primed respondents’ consequentialist preferences by providing additional information
about the number of asylum applications that would be assigned to the respondent’s country
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under each of the three allocation rules (see Supplementary Information for details). This ma-
nipulation makes it easy for respondents who are driven by a consequentialist logic to identify
the specific allocation that would minimize the number of asylum seekers for their country. To
make the consequences treatment as realistic as possible, we piped in the actual number of asy-
lum applications reported over the 2015 period by Eurostat for each country as the expected
number of asylum seekers under the country-of-first-entry answer option. Using the real num-
bers for the status quo ensures that we captured the relevant benchmark for any policy reform
since these numbers reflect both the current regulations as well as any departures from the rules
(see Supplementary Information for details). To compute the numbers for the equal allocation
rule, we evenly divided the total number of applications among all 15 countries, and for the
proportional allocation rule, we relied on country-specific weights based on the official alloca-
tion proposal made by the European Commission, which includes the following elements: 40%
population, 40% total GDP, 10% number of past applications, and 10% unemployment rate [8].
The lower panels in Figure 2 show the results for respondents who were assigned to the con-
sequences treatment (lower left) or both the consequences treatment and information treatment
(lower right). There are two key findings. First, prompting respondents with the consequences
clearly has an important impact on support for proportional allocation. If their country benefits
from proportional allocation (those shown above the dashed line), providing the actual numbers
increases support, while if their country faces a higher responsibility under proportional allo-
cation, providing the numbers reduces support. This relationship holds for each of the fifteen
countries and suggests that consequentialist considerations play a significant role in shaping
preferences for the allocation of asylum seekers. Second, even when respondents see the im-
plied numbers, a majority of 56% of respondents still prefer proportional allocation, despite
the fact that it would increase the number of asylum seekers for most countries. In contrast,
only 27% of respondents prefer the status quo allocation and only 17% of respondents prefer
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an equal allocation in this condition; in fact, a higher percentage supports equal allocation over
the status quo in several countries.
Particularly relevant for the viability of a potential policy reform, Figure 3 shows the differ-
ence in support for proportional allocation versus the status quo. When not shown the numbers
of asylum seekers, large majorities of respondents prefer proportional allocation over the sta-
tus quo in all countries. And even when respondents are prompted about the consequences,
there are still more respondents who prefer proportional allocation than those who prefer the
status quo in all but three countries, including seven of the ten countries in which proportional
allocation would result in an increase in the number of asylum seekers. Even in the three coun-
tries that prefer the status quo (Czech Republic, Poland, and the United Kingdom), there is still
meaningful support, with more than 25% of respondents in each preferring proportional allo-
cation. In the Supplementary Information, we also show that a similar pattern holds when we
consider the respondents’ full ranking of all three allocation mechanisms. We also show that
strong support for proportional allocation over the status quo remains robust—with and without
the consequences treatment—across various subsets of respondents including those on the left,
center, and right of the political spectrum, those with low and high political knowledge, and
those who support a decrease and increase in the number of asylum seekers in general.
Overall, these findings suggest that considerations of both consequences and fairness shape
voters’ preferences over asylum allocation policy. Yet when the two collide, the norm of pro-
portional equality overrides consequentialist preferences for most voters.
[Figure 3 about here.]
In order to ameliorate the refugee crisis, European countries need to work together to pro-
vide adequate humanitarian protection, share responsibilities, and realize the full gains from
international cooperation. The results of our study suggest that there is firm ground for greater
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cooperation, and they have important implications for theory and policy.
For theory, the results provide evidence that in the context of a highly salient international
policy decision—where voters have strong preferences and stakes are high—the norm of pro-
portional equality can preponderate over narrow consequentialist considerations. Voters care
not only about the consequences of this policy reform, but also about the inherent fairness of
the design of the asylum system. Clearly, more work is needed to better understand domestic
support for the design of other international institutions. However, the power of the proportional
equality norm in the highly contentious context of asylum allocation suggests that it might en-
able coordination in other areas where the international provision of public goods is controver-
sial, such as climate change mitigation, environmental protection, and financial bailouts.
The results also inform policy. Recent public backlash against efforts to accommodate asy-
lum seekers creates a serious challenge for reforming the CEAS, as such reform would entail
increasing the number of asylum seekers allocated to most countries. However, our results sug-
gest that voters would tolerate an increase in the number of asylum seekers allocated to their
own country as long as responsibilities are fairly shared across Europe. This points to a viable
pan-European consensus to move toward a responsibility-sharing mechanism that allocates asy-
lum seekers in proportion to the countries’ capacities.
It is important to emphasize that the strong public support for proportional allocation un-
covered by this study does not imply that reforming the asylum system will be frictionless.
Recall that in three of the fifteen countries, a majority of respondents support the status quo
when prompted to consider the consequences. However, in each of these countries more than a
quarter of these respondents still support proportional allocation, suggesting that policymakers
could potentially reach a consensus. More broadly, public support for proportional allocation
could be either weakened or strengthened if voters were exposed to the countervailing forces of
political framing by opponents and advocates of the reform.
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On the one hand, support could be weakened if opponents are able to raise the salience of
the potential costs of increasing the number of asylum seekers in those countries whose respon-
sibility would grow under the reform. On the other hand, given that we conducted our survey at
the height of the European refugee crisis, it should have been the case that our respondents were
already heavily primed about these concerns. In addition, our consequences treatment made this
consideration highly salient and easily accessible to respondents by explicitly informing them of
how many asylum seekers each policy option would entail for their own country. Furthermore,
in the framing battle surrounding this policy reform, advocates would also fiercely promote fair-
ness considerations to justify moving to a proportional allocation, for instance, by emphasizing
to voters that other countries with similar capacities would also take on a similar responsibility.
Even though our study did not test this explicitly, it stands to reason that prompting voters with
such fairness considerations would, if anything, further increase support for the proportional
allocation.
In sum, the extensiveness of the support for proportional allocation over the current regula-
tions across Europe suggests that a reform could be broadly agreeable to the public, which is
critical in giving policymakers latitude to take action. At the very least, they should be embold-
ened by this evidence that there is little reason to fear reprisal in the court of public opinion.
Methods
Sample
We conducted our survey in fifteen European countries that belong to the CEAS. The sample includes Austria,
the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. In each country, we surveyed about 1,200 eligible voters, such
that the total sample size is about N = 18, 000 respondents (see Supplementary Information for details). The
international survey firm Respondi recruited respondents from the population of eligible voters in each country
to which the survey was administered online. We use entropy balancing to reweight our sample data to match
the country-specific demographic margins from the populations. We excluded 147 respondents for whom weights
could not be constructed due to missing data. The Supplementary Information provides detailed information about
the survey translation, recruitment process, response rate, survey length, compensation, descriptive statistics, and
unweighted results. Informed consent was obtained from each participant at the beginning of the survey. The
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survey was approved by Stanford University’s Institutional Review Board (protocol ID: 34881) and conducted
according to the University of Zurich’s policy for human subjects research.
Study Design
In each country, each respondent was randomly assigned to one of four conditions: The baseline condition, a
condition where respondents are exposed to the information treatment, a condition where respondents are exposed
to the consequences treatment, and a condition where respondents are exposed to the both the information treatment
and consequences treatment. Randomization was automated, thus the investigators were blinded to the treatment
assignment allocation during the survey administration.
For the baseline condition, we asked respondents after a short introductory text (see the Supplementary Infor-
mation for details) the following question to measure what type of allocation mechanism for asylum seekers they
prefer:
“In your opinion, how should the number of asylum applications per country be determined? The number of
asylum applications allocated to each European country should be
• based on the country of first entry (e.g. asylum seekers are required to submit their asylum application in
the European country in which they initially arrive).
• the same for every European country (e.g. asylum seekers are allocated such that each European country
receives the same number of asylum applications).
• proportional to the country’s capacity (e.g. asylum seekers are allocated to each European country de-
pending on its population, GDP, unemployment rate, and number of past applications).”
The information treatment was designed to examine whether preferences change when we provide voters with
policy relevant information about the different allocation mechanisms. The information prompt that respondents
assigned to the information treatment received immediately before being asked the question about the preferred
allocation read as follows:
“Under current regulations, asylum seekers are generally required to submit their applications in the country
through which they first entered Europe (i.e. the ‘country of first entry’). The goal behind this policy is to max-
imize efficiency. However, some people have pointed out that the current policy puts an unfair burden on border
countries that are more likely to serve as entry points for asylum seekers. Accordingly, they recommend allocating
asylum applications either equally across all countries or based on each country’s capacity.”
The Supplementary Information provides more details about the rationale of the information treatment.
The consequences treatment was designed to examine whether preferences change when we explicitly prime
the consequentialist preferences of respondents. Respondents assigned to the consequences treatment received an
alternative version of the question about the preferred allocation, in which a sentence was added at the end of each
option specifying the associated number of asylum applications. The alternative question, using the example of
the United Kingdom, read as follows:
“In your opinion, how should the number of asylum applications per country be determined? The number of
asylum applications allocated to each European country should be
• based on the country of first entry (e.g. asylum seekers are required to submit their asylum application in
the European country in which they initially arrive). This would mean approximately 38,700 applications
allotted to the United Kingdom.
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• the same for every European country (e.g. asylum seekers are allocated such that each European country
receives the same number of asylum applications). This would mean approximately 43,200 applications
allotted to the United Kingdom
• proportional to the country’s capacity (e.g. asylum seekers are allocated to each European country de-
pending on its population, GDP, unemployment rate, and number of past applications). This would mean
approximately 159,600 applications allotted to the United Kingdom.”
This randomized manipulation makes explicit what the consequences of the various allocation mechanisms
would be in terms of the number of asylum seekers assigned to the respondent’s country. It makes it easy for
respondents who are driven by consequentialist preferences to pick out the allocation that would mean the lowest
number of asylum seekers allocated to their own country. The Supplementary Information provides more details
about the rationale of the consequences treatment.
In the fourth condition, respondents received both the information treatment and the consequences treatment.
Variable Definitions
The Supplementary Information provides the measures and question wordings for all variables used in the analysis.
Statistical Analysis
The statistical analysis underlying the figures in the main text employs the entropy balancing weights. The un-
weighted results are very similar and detailed in the Supplementary Information subgroup analysis and summary
statistics are reported in the Supplementary Information.
Data Availability
Replication data can be accessed at Dataverse http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/PTKD7K.
Code Availability
Replication code can be accessed at Dataverse http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/PTKD7K.
References
[1] UNHCR. Emergency Information Sharing Web Portal: Mediterranean.
http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php. Tech. Rep. (2016).
[2] Raitio, J. The Principle of Legal Certainty in EC Law (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003).
[3] European Council on Refugees and Exiles. Dublin ii regulation: Lives on hold” - european comparative
report. Tech. Rep. (2013). Available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/513ef9632.html.
[4] McDonough, P., Kmak, M. & van Selm, J. Sharing responsibility for refugee protection in europe: Dublin
reconsidered (2008).
[5] Neumayer, E. Asylum destination choice what makes some west european countries more attractive than
others? European Union Politics 5, 155–180 (2004).
[6] Bozorgmehr, K. & Wahedi, K. Reframing solidarity in europe: Frontex, frontiers, and the fallacy of refugee
quota. The Lancet Public Health (2016).
13
[7] Thielemann, E. R. Between Interests and Norms: Explaining Burden-Sharing in the European Union. Journal
of Refugee Studies 16, 253–273 (2003).
[8] Commission, E. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Euro-
pean Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A European Agenda on Migration.
Tech. Rep. (2015).
[9] Suhrke, A. Burden-sharing during refugee emergencies: the logic of collective versus national action. Journal
of Refugee Studies 11, 396–415 (1998).
[10] Betts, A. Public Goods Theory and the Provision of Refugee Protection: The Role of the Joint-Product
Model in Burden Sharing Theory. Journal of Refugee Studies 16, 274–296 (2003).
[11] Thielemann, E. R. & Dewan, T. The myth of free-riding: Refugee protection and implicit burden-sharing.
West European Politics 29, 351–369 (2006).
[12] Fetzer, J. S. Public attitudes toward immigration in the United States, France, and Germany (Cambridge
University Press, 2000).
[13] Ivarsflaten, E. Threatened by diversity: Why restrictive asylum and immigration policies appeal to western
europeans. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties 15, 21–45 (2005).
[14] Pew Research Center. Europeans fear wave of refugees will mean more terrorism, fewer jobs
(http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/07/11/europeans-fear-wave-of-refugees-will-mean-more-terrorism-fewer-
jobs) (2016).
[15] Bansak, K., Hainmueller, J. & Hangartner, D. How economic, humanitarian, and religious concerns shape
european attitudes toward asylum seekers. Science 354, 217–222 (2016).
[16] Bechtel, M. M. & Scheve, K. F. Mass support for global climate agreements depends on institutional design.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 110, 13763–13768 (2013).
[17] Hainmueller, J. Entropy balancing for causal effects: A multivariate reweighting method to produce balanced
samples in observational studies. Political Analysis 20, 25–46 (2011).
[18] Gosepath, S. Equality. In Zalta, E. N. (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2011), spring 2011
edn.
[19] Moulin, H. Handbook of social choice and welfare, vol. 1, chap. Axiomatic cost and surplus sharing, 289–
357 (Elsevier, 2002).
[20] Ga¨chter, S. & Riedl, A. Dividing justly in bargaining problems with claims. Social Choice and Welfare 27,
571–594 (2006).
[21] Herrero, C., Moreno-Ternero, J. D. & Ponti, G. On the adjudication of conflicting claims: an experimental
study. Social Choice and Welfare 34, 145–179 (2010).
[22] Bosmans, K. & Schokkaert, E. Equality preference in the claims problem: a questionnaire study of cuts in
earnings and pensions. Social Choice and Welfare 33, 533–557 (2009).
Correspondence: Correspondence and requests for materials should be addressed to DH.
Acknowledgements: We acknowledge funding from the Swiss National Science Foundation (grant #100017 159820)
that enabled data collection and the Ford Foundation for operational support of the Immigration Policy Lab. The
funders had no role in the conceptualization, design, data collection, analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of
the manuscript. For helpful advice, we thank Thomas Huddleston, David Laitin, Duncan Lawrence, Robert Reich,
and Judith Spirig.
Author contributions KB, JH, and DH all conceived the research, designed the analyses, conducted the analyses,
and wrote the manuscript.
Competing interests The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Supplementary information is available for this paper http://www.dx.doi.org/XXXX.
14
Figure 1: Public Support for Increasing the Number of Asylum seekers. Percent of respon-
dents that support increasing the number of asylum seekers in each of the fifteen surveyed coun-
tries. Estimates employ sample weights. Corresponding normality-based 95% CI are shown.
Pooled N = 17, 883.
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Figure 2: Public Support for Various Allocations of Asylum Seekers. Percent of respondents
that prefer proportional, equal, or status quo allocation given random assignment to one of
four conditions. The baseline condition (N = 4530) asked for the respondents’ preferences
without any additional intervention (top left panel A). The information treatment (N = 4438)
informed respondents of the status quo policy and policy relevant arguments (top right panel B).
The consequences treatment (N = 4423) informed respondents about the number of asylum
seekers that their country would receive under each allocation (bottom left panel C). The fourth
condition included both the information treatment and the consequences treatment (N = 4492)
(bottom right panel D). Countries are ordered such that the country at the bottom (top) would
see the largest increase (decrease) in the number of asylum seekers when moving from the status
quo to proportional allocation; the dashed horizontal line separates the countries that would see
an increase versus a decrease. Estimates employ sample weights.
A. Baseline B. Information Treatment
C. Consequences Treatment D. Both Treatments
Pooled
United Kingdom
France
Spain
Poland
Italy
Czech Republic
Greece
Netherlands
Denmark
Switzerland
Norway
Austria
Sweden
Hungary
Germany
Pooled
United Kingdom
France
Spain
Poland
Italy
Czech Republic
Greece
Netherlands
Denmark
Switzerland
Norway
Austria
Sweden
Hungary
Germany
0 25 50 75 100 0 25 50 75 100
Distribution of Preferences over
Allocation of Asylum−Seeker Applications (%)
Preference Proportional Same for All Status Quo
16
Figure 3: Support for Proportional versus Status Quo Allocation of Asylum Seekers. Dif-
ference in the percent of respondents that support proportional allocation versus status quo
allocation by country of first entry given random assignment to the consequences treatment.
Countries are ordered such that the country at the bottom (top) would see the largest increase
(decrease) in the number of asylum seekers when moving from the status quo to proportional
allocation. Estimates employ sample weights. Corresponding normality-based 95% CI are
shown. N = 17, 883.
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